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Product Line Rivalry

Abstract:
This paper examines product selection by multi-product firms. taking
explicit account of the sequential nature of real decisions:

firms choose

product lines before the quantity or price rivalry with other firms is
resolved.

Unlike most previous work on multi-product firms, we focus on

demand side strategic considerations rather than on the cost side as a
determinant of product offerings.

We find that close substitutes being
,..

produced by the same firms (segmentation) is a natural outcome, in contrast
to conventional wisdom.

The influence of entry deterrence on product

selection and the possible policy of restricting firms' product off~ring are
also considered.

\

Product Line Rivalry

1. Introduction
Most firms offer entire product lines rather than single products.
There is, however, only a relatively small body of literature devoted to
product line selection by multiproduct firms. 1• What analysis does exist
has focussed almost entirely on cost considerations.

Multi-product firms

are seen to emerge as the consequence of economies of scope ._in production.
A recent survey of the literature on multiproduct firms (Bailey and
Friedlander, 1982) addresses only cost-side considerations.

Our view is

that interactions between the demands for different products, as well as
interactions between their supplies, is an important determinant of the
range of products that a single firm will produce.
How is it that product lines are determined? Certainly we see several
different patterns in the real world.

Probably the most coovnon pattern is

that each firm produces a wide range of varieties within a product group,
and a number of firms produce very similar, and sometimes virtually ident
ical, products.

Ford· and General Motors produce closely competing product

lines, as do Nikon, Canon, and Minolta in the camera industry, and so on.
Occasionally, however, one firm manages to gain almost exclusive control
over a well-defined part of the product· spectrum, and does not venture into
other parts.

is Rolls Royce in the automobile industry,
An obvious example
. .
.

and a trip through a department store.will yield a number of other examples.
Naturally, more complex versions of this basic pattern arise.

A single firm

may have several areas of control in a product group, or two or three firms
may dominate one part of the product spectrum, while other firms produce less
closely substitutable product lines. In addition, a fairly common historical
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pattern is for firms to expand the scope of their product offerin gs and
compete more direct ly with each other as the market grows.
Spence(1976), in a paper concerned mainly with single product firms,
sugges ts the result that, in the multiproduct case, close substi tutes will
rd: if firm
be produced by differe nt firms. The reason is fairly straigh tforwa
A produces product 1 and product 2 is a close substi tute, then production

of product 2 is likely to appear more attract ive to firm B than to firm A
because B will not be concerned about the consequent reducti on in demand for
product 1.
However, one wonders, mightn 't firm A recognize that if it doesn' t
produce product 2, firm B will, and therefo re try to pre-empt B. Strate gic
pre-emption require s a two-stage (or more) decisio n proces s. In choosing
to produce a particu lar product firms must anticip ate that this will have
some effect on later competition.
product selecti on occurs .

But surely this is precis ely the way

As argued by Presco tt and Vissch er{l97 7), product

select ions, once decided upon, are not easily changed. Product selecti on is a
2
convnitment which, to a first approximation, is taken as given in the
following output or price rivalry .
In this paper we make a series of straigh tforwa rd but, we feel, sign
nifica nt points about product selecti on by multiproduct firms. In part\

icular , using a very simple structu re,

we find

that sequen tial decisio ns on

product type and output nat~ra lly give rise to equilib ria in which a single
firm monopolizes close substi tutes. Such outcomes only hold for certain
levels of demand and, therefo re, might be observed only over some portion of
the life cycle of the indust ry.
Section 2 sets out.th e basic model, section 3 briefly consid ers
monopoly, and section 4 derives the main results on product line rivalry .

- .:,

Section 5 presents a result on product line choice and entry deterrence,
section 6 addresses the issue of whether restricting finns to one product
each can reduce market variety, and section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2.

The Model
To examine product line rivalry we consider a constellation of four

possible products.

Two products are cJ ose substitutes for each other and

more distant substitutes for the other pair, which are in turn close sub
stitutes for each other.

In particular, commodity pairs (l,2) and (3,4)

are close substitutes, while pairs (1,3), {1,4), (2,3) and {2,4) are more
distant substitutes. This is about the simplest structure in which the
question of whether competing multiproduct firms produce close or distant
substitutes can be addressed.

Demand for the four products arises from a

utility function that is approximated by the form

U(X,m)

=

4 + m
u(x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x)

(1)

where x1 is consumption of product i, X denotes a vector of xis, and mis
expenditure on other goods. The inverse demand for product i is then just the
derivative of u with ~espect to xi:
i

p (X) =

u1 (x 1 =x 2 =x 3 ,x 4 )

(2)

where pi is the inverse demand {or price) for product i, and where sub
scripts denote partial derivatives.
\

To focus as clearly as possible on the

essential issues we assume that the demand structure is perfectly symmetric
except for the difference~ _in substitutability already described.

To say that

goods 1 and 2 are closer substitutes than 1 and 3 means that the
response of p1 to a change in the output of good 2 is greater in absolute
value than the response to a change in x3• Since these goods are substitutes
the cross price effects are negative, and we have
(3)

where i and j are close substitutes and i and k are more distant substitutes .
We could imagine that the degree of substitutab ility might vary with X and
that goods that were close substitutes in some ranges might be distant sub
stitutes in others.

To make the questions we wish to address well-define d

without complication, (3) 1s assumed to hold uniformly: goods 1 and 2, for
example, are always closer substitutes than 1 and 3.
One example of a computationally simple demand structure with the
properties described here arises from quadratic utility:

u

=

T
aX + X BX,

where b12 and b34 are equal and exceed otherioff-d iagonal elements of this
sy11111etric matrix 8, which are themselves equal. We will use this func
tional form in some illustration s of our results.
A firm that produces any of the four products must have made three
decisions:

(i) how many products to produce (the scope decision) (ii)

which particular products to produce (the line decision) and (iii) which
quantity to produce (or which price to charge) for each product.

As log

ical possibil-iti es we might imagine that these decisions could be made
sequentiall y, or that the first or second two, or even all three, could be
made simultaneously.

Which assumption is appropriate in any particular

case depends on actual technological considerati ons.

In most of our anal

ysis we treat the product line decision as strictly prior to the final
price or quantity choice.

In other words·, firms establish prices or

quantities taking their own.and their rivals line and scope decisions as
given.
The final stage may, as .indicated, be either a price decision or a
3 For concreteness, in this paper, we take quantity as
quantity decision.
the third stage decision· variable.

We have examined a number of our re

sults when price 1s the final decision variable, and tbe central insights
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• of our analysis were not affected.
The overall equilibrium concept we work with is the subgame perfect
equilibrium.

This equilibrium concept incorporates two important ideas:

first, the equilibrium is non-cooperative so that at each stage equilibrium
occurs when each firm is maximizing profit, given the current and previous
strategy variable levels chosen by its rival, and second, each firm under
stands at any stage how future stages will be affected by current
•..
4
d ec1s1ons.

Our assumptions about technology are very simple.

Each firm incurs a

sunk cost K for each product it plans to produce at the time of the scope
decision.

(Indeed, it may be this sunk cost which contributes to making

the scope decision credible.) A constant marginal cost c is incurred at the
time quantity decisions are made.
all four products.

Kand care assumed to be the same for

Note that, while there is interaction among demands for

the four commodities, we assume that their cost structures are indepen
dent:
3.

in particular, there are no economies or diseconomies of scope.

Monopoly
Although we are principally concerned with the rivalry between firms,

there is one important insight to be established for the monopoly case.
Specifically, if a monopolist chooses to produce only two products, it will
\

choose two distant substitutes rather than two close substitutes.

The

reasoning involved is fa1r~y straightforward, but it is worth being pre
Imagine that the monopolist is producing products 1 and 2, which are
close substitutes, at the profit-maximizing levels. By symmetry x1=x 2{=x).

cise.

Holding the output level of product 1 fixed, imagine replacing production
3
of x2 with an equal amount· of x.

Let x• = (x,x,0,0) and let X" =

(x,O,x,O). The effect on the price of good 1 is as follows.

- 6 -

4 pl = pl(x11) - pl(X')
1
1
= (P 3(X*) - P z{X*))x

(4)

for some X* on the line segment joining X' and X". {This is an example of
the mean value theorem 5.) From (3), this price change must be positive and,
by symnetry, the other price must also ~i&e.

Therefore, even without

optimal readjustment of quantities, prices and profits must.rise.
Therefore, a monopolist who plans to produce just two goods, and who is
unconcerned about entry, will produce two distant substitutes.

Th1s result

serves as a useful base for comparison with the two firm case.

4.

Three-Stage Duopoly

4.1 The output decision
We now discuss the duopoly equilibrium when firms make the scope, line,
and output decisions in sequence.

We examine the decisions in reverse order,

starting with the output- decisions of firms already committed to particular
iine and scope decisions.

The third stage is modelled as a Nash quantity (or

Cournot) game, taking line and scope decisions of both firms as given.

There

are many possible configurations of scope and line with which firms might
enter the quantity stage.

Each of the four products might be produced by firm

A, by firm B, by both firms, or by neither firm, giving rise to 256 possib
ilities.

Many configurations are, however, isomorphic to one another, and

many are relatively uninteresting in that they do not bear on the questions
of interest, as, for example, when one firm produces all four products and
the other nothing.
The most interestiong situations for our analysis are those in which·
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each firm produces two products. Finn A might produce one pair of close
substitutes while firm B produces the other pair. We refer to this case as
market segmentation.

An alternative, market interlacing, occurs when each

firm produces two less closely related products, as, for example, if firm A
produces goods 1 and 3 while finn B produces goods 2 and 4.

Note that

segmentation or interlacing is determined in the line stage, and is taken
as given when final output levels are being determined.
Consider the firms' profits in the two cases.

Finn A's profit under

segmentation is
n

s

11

= p

22

1

2

x + p x - .c(x + x } - 2K

(5}

where, for concreteness, firm A is assumed to produce goods 1 and 2.
superscripts denotes segmentation.

The

The first order condition associated with

product 1 can be written
s

nl
where MR 1

=

=

1

2 2

MR + x pl

-

C

(6)

= 0

x1p11 + pl, is own marginal revenue. · Second order

conditions are

!·

s
1fi i < 0
\

s

s

(7)

s s

1Tll 1T22 - ,rl2ir21

(8}

>O

The first order condition for product 2 is ·similar to (6).

Firm B produc

ing products 3 and 4 has synmetric first and second order conditions.

Each

first" order condition shows, implicitly, the profit-maximizing choice.for
one product, given the output levels of the others.

The solution of these

four reaction functions is the (noncooperative} Nash equilibrium in
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quantit ies. By synmetry there is an equilibrium in which all quantit ies
are equal (and all prices are equal), and we assume that demand is suf
ficient ly regular that this equilibrium is unique.

We assume also that own

marginal revenue decline s when the output of any other good rises.
{9)

MR~< 0
J

This is a natural condition which holds for most {but not all) plausib le
demand structu res. (See our discussion in Section 6).
Under interlac ing, firm A p~oduces, let us say, products 1 and 3. (One
can substitu te i and k to achieve general ity.) This leads to the first order
conditio n

and to similar second order conditions as before.
interlac ing.

The subscri pt t denotes

The fundamental comparative property of segmentation and

interlac ing is expressed in Proposition 1.

.

The segmented structu re gives rise to higher prices and profits than the
interlac ed structu re.
Proof:

By synmetry all products sell for· the same price, denoted ps under

segmentation and pt under. i~terlac ing. There are three possibi lities:
pt= ps, pt> ps, or pt< ps. The first two lead to contrad ictions.
Consider first the equality case. If prices are equal then quantit ies
1
must also be equal in the two regimes, and so must MR • However,
p21 < p31 so (6) and (10) ·cannot both be satisfie d. Therefore
pt cannot equal ps.
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Now consider pt> ps.

This implies xt

MR 1 is larger ··under interlacing.

Since pf

< xs and, by (9) that

< p~ < 0,

it follows

once again that (6) and (10) could not both be satisfied.

Therefore

pt< p5 as was to be shown.

That profi~s are higher when price is higher and output lower follows
from the observation that Qoth structures have output levels above the joint
maximizing level, and that profit declines monotonically with symmetric
increases in output beyond the joint-maximizing level.

* * *
These interlacing and segmentation structures are only two of many
possibilities.

Even confining attention to the scope structure of two

products per firm we might imagine that the same product or products could
be produced by both firms, leaving one or two products unproduced.

It is

cl ear that profits in such cases would normally fall short of profits even
in the interlaced case, given the synvnetric structure of demand.

There is

also a series of cases in which each product is produced by at least one
firm, with some overlapping in the sense that some products are produced by
both firms.

We defer consideration of these and other cases for the pre

sent so as to move on to consideration.of the line decision.
\

4.2 The line decision
·When making the line decision firms take the scope decision of how many
produ~ts to produce as fixed, and have only to decide upon which products to
produce.

The case for separation of the line and scope decisions is not as

compelling as that for separation of line and output.decisions.

Nevertheless,
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it seems to capture an important flavour of real product selection in that
firms often commit themselves to a particular market, especially to new or
anticipated markets, well before actual product types are decided upon.
Separation of line and scope is not crucial to the analysis in any case, but
it is our feeling that the full three stage model brings out the logical
structure of the argument most clearly.
When making the product line decision firms are aware that they will be
involved in a noncooperative output game in the future and take this into
account in the line stage. Consider first the case in which each firm is
committed, from the scope stage, to producing two products.
several possibilities we wish to examine.

There are

Firms may make product choices

simultaneously , in which case the equilibrium is just the usual noncooperative
reaction function equilibrium where reactions are product selections.
natively, firms may move sequentially in choosing product type.

Alter

In addition,

we introduce a simultaneous Stackelberg equilibrium concept.
The Nash product selection reaction functions are quite simple.

Given

the two products chosen by a rival, one's "Nash reaction" is the optimal
choice for one's own two products.

With synvnetric demand, we restrict

attention to the case in which, given the choice of one's rival, the best
6 Proposition 2 follows
response is to choose the other two products.
\

directly.

Proposition 2
Both market segmentation and market interlacing are Nash equilibria.

***
The reason that both segmented and interlaced structures are observed
may simply be that both are Nash equifibria at the Hne stage and can
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therefore be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium structure for the entire
game.

This simple insight itself seems a worthwhile addition to the

Spence{l976) discussion.

When the real sequencing of product selection and

output rivalry are taken into account it is quite possible that close
substitutes will be produced by a single firm.
In fact the case for segmentation is much

stronger than this. Imagine

now that the line decision process is slightly asymmetric so that one firm is
able to choose its two products first.

This may occur because of random

factors in the product selection process or for some other exogenous reason.
Formally the game becomes a four stage game.

As part of the perfect equil

ibrium structure, the first firm to choose knows what its rival will do in
the next stage; in particular it knows that whichever products it chooses,
its rival .will choose the other two 7• Effectively, then, the first firm is in
a position to choose either market segmentation or market interlacing as
industry structures.

Since market segmentation leads to higher profits for

each firm, Proposition 3 is inmediate.
Proposition. 3
Tf f;rmc

.-. •

• • • ..,..,

onf-of'II

'-''""'"-'

+ho 1-ino ~+:.no .. ..,.,..•• ,... ... +.;-s11u
"'"'-'

1 •••~

~1,,u~'I;;"

~111:'"'tUClllr I U I I J

-~+"--- .._ .... __
I Ql,,IICI

l,.flQfl

simultaneously ,

market segmentation is the equilibrium.

* * *
There is some disagreement over whether exogenous asymmetries of oppor
tunity of the sort underlyin~ Proposition 3 are appropriate.

We remain agnos

tic on this issue, but we now present an equilibrium concept that does not
rely on asynmetries but leads unambiguously to market segmentation: the

Stackelberg leader-leader equilibrium.
We define a Stackelberg strategy as one which involves taking into
account the contemporaneous noncooperative reaction of one's rival in
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set~ing one's own strategy.

8 In the output case, if both players follow

Stackelberg strategies, the outcome is not an equilibrium because both
firms choose an output other than what the other expects.

However, a

Stackelberg strategy at the line stage leads a firm to assume that if it
chooses two products, its rival will choose the other two, leading it to
choose two close substitutes .

The other firm, also following a Stackelberg

strategy, will be doing the same thing.

The Stackelberg equilibrium arises

when the firms choose different pairs.
Proposition -4
The ·product line game has a joint Stackelberg equilibrium , and this
equilibrium is characteriz ed by market segmentation.

* * *
Note that this joint Stackelberg solution, because it coincides with a
Nash equilibrium , is self-enforc ing from a noncooperative point of view, and
is therefore credible to the firms in earlier stages, and is, as a result,
admissible as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium structure.
Stepping back for a moment from the formal equilibrium concept, let us
consider the nature of the firms we are considering .
naive.

These firms are not

They understand the incentive structure in which they operate and

they perceive that other firms are very much like themselves.
'.

They go to

the Nash ou~put equilibrium , not because.of a naive adjustment mechanism
based on expectation s that are continuously falsified, but because they
accept that the Nash equilibrium is an individuall y rational solution.
Firms would like to collude, but in the absence of clearly specified en
forcement mechanisms that would make collusion individuall y rational,
cannot expect to achieve the collusive outcome.

What they can do is make

decisions at earlier stages that affect the outcome of the Nash game.

If
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an earlier decision yields a Nash equilibrium that is strictly better for
both firms, then surely this is the decision one would expect the firms to
make.

This is the nature of the joint Stackelberg equilibrium, and leads

to~ strong presumption in favour of the

segmented

solution, given the

initial scope decision of two products each.
4.3 The-Scope·oecision
Why should the firms settle on two products each? Consider the Nash
reaction functions for the scope decision.

Demand may be sufficiently low

t~~t if one firm commits to only one product, the other firm would prefer
not to enter at all.

On the other hand, demand may be so great that even if

one firm committed itself to all four products, the optimal response of its
rival would be to produce all four products also: complete overlapping. 9
Only if demand is in that intermediate range where the optimal response to
a scope decision of two is also two can the equilibrium structure described
in the previous subsection emerge.

Nevertheless, the point remains that

there are ranges of demand for which market segmentation is the full subgame
perfect equilibrium.

However, as growth occurred in the market and the game

were repeated, market segmentation would be replaced by market overlapping.
The overlapping market is similar in essence to the Spence(1976)
argument that similar products will be produced by different firms.
overlapping, identical products are produced by different firms.
reason is as follows.

With

The

Suppose firm A has committed itself to all four

products, and firm Bis considering entering.

Firm B recognizes that in

the final output stage it will not take into account effects of its pro
duction on the revenue of firm A:

it knows it will have an incentive to

expand output beyond what firm A would choose for itself and therefore
knows it will earn some variable profit.

If demand is ·sufficiently high so

-
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that this variable profit will exceed sunk costs, firm B will enter.
A cannot deter entry because it can make no credible threat;

Firm

the only

thing firm B believes about firm A is that it will always follow its curr
ent individual best interest.

If, as in Dixit{l980}, Spence(1977,1979) or

Friedman(l977), we introduced a capital decision which could affect final
stage marginal cost, Firm A could undertake additional strategic behaviour,
but it would not even then necessarily find it profitable to deter entry
by firm B•
... We have presented a very simple model which we believe throws some 1ight
on product line rivalry between firms.

We find that market segmentation is

a very·reasonable outcome once the multi-stage structure of market rivalry
is explicitly recognized, although many other configurations are possible,
including overlapping of firms.

In the next section we discuss how the

threat of further entry can lead to a situaion in which interlacing rather
than segmentation is the more likely outcome.

5.

Competition as Entry Deterrence
Our analysis thus far has assumed that at the time firms make their

iine decisions there is no possibility of further entry.

Relaxing this

assumption leads to the possibility that the outcome of sequential product
line choice or a joint Stackelberg equilibrium is one of market interlacing:
firms that have already entered and made a scope decision deliberately
choose an interlaced structure to make the market more competitive, reducing
the profitability of further entry.
Consider again the constellation of four products of equation (1) and
the product line decisions of two firms, firms A and 8, each having a scope
of two products.

Propositions 2 and 3 established the presumption in favour

of segmentation in the absence of a threat of entry.
further entry is possible.

Assume, however, that

Consider, for simplicit y, the case of a single

firm enterring and establish ing productio n of just one of the four products.
Because of the symmetry of our specifica tion, it does not matter which one, so
assume that it is product 1.

If firm A has committed itself to products

1 and 2 and firm 8 to products 3 and 4 (the segmented case), then the profits
of the ~hree firms will be given by
ASE

= p l (X)

l
2
2
XA + p (X) x2 - c(xAl + x)
- 2K

BSE

= p3(X)

x

ESE

= pl(X)

l
XE

n

n

n

where X = (x A
1

+

3

1
XE,

(11)

4
4
+ p (X) x - c(x 3 + x 4) - 2K

ex

(12)

l
E- K

(13)

2 X,
3 X4)·
X,

and the outputs are at their Cournot equilibriu m values.

x!

xi

Here
denotes the output of commodity 1 produced by firm A and
that
produced by the entrant;n ASE, n85 E and wESE denote equilibriu m profits·
'

of firm A, firm B, and the entrant, respectiv ely, unde; market segmenta tion
with entry.

•

Under market interlaci ng, with firm A committed to producing product 1
and 3 and firm B to 2 and·4, with entry profits will be given by
wAIE = p1(x) xl + p3(x) x3 - c(xl + x3 ) - 2K

(15)

~~IE= p2(X) x2 + p4(X) x4 - c(x2+x4) - 2K

(16)
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~

EIE

= p

l

l
(X) XE

1
cxE - K

( 17)

.
1eves
1 of th e th ree
wh ere now nAIE , nBIE an d nEIE denot e th e equ1· 1 1"b r1um
firms' profits when product lines are interlaced.

X continues to be defined

by (14), and the outputs assume their Cournot values under interlacing.
Finally, under market intelacing without-entry firms A and B will earn
11'.A.I and ,.. 81 given by
( 18)
i

,.-

BI

2

= p (X) x

2

4
4
2
4
+ p (X) x - c(x + x) - 2K

( 19)
(20)

We now state:
Proposition·s
With the threat of further entry the interlaced stucture can give rise
to higher prices and profits than_ the segmented structure.
Proof:

This result obtains if:

(1) under segmentation entry is profit

able (,rESE 0), (2) under inte-rlacing it is _not (,rEIE

< 0) and (3) firms A

and B earn higher profits with an interlaced structure and no entry than
with a segmented structure with entry (nAI >/SE andn 81 >nBSE).

To estab

lish that these three conditions can be satisfied simulataneously we pre
sent an example using the linear demand structure introduced in Section 2,
u = aX

+

XTBX.

(The calculations are long and tedi0llS, and were done on a
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computer).

When b..
= 1, i = 1, 2, 3, 4;
11

b13 = b14 = b23 = b = .1, a= 5, c
24
segmentation with entry:

= 2, and K = .4 we obtain, under

P = (2.93, 3.26, 3.37, 3.37)
1r

ASE

= 0.16

BSE = 0.64
ESE = 0.03
1r
,r

Under interlacing with entry:
P

{2.85, 3.20, 3.23, 3.25}

=

AIE = 0.23
BIE = 0.56
1r
,r

1r

EIE = -0.04

Finally, under interlacing without entry:
P = (3.27, 3.27, 3.27, 3.27)
11
11

AI

=

0.66

BI= 0• 66

At these values market segmentation permits entry while interlacing does
not.

The initial two entrants earn higher profits under interlacing

without entry than under a segmented structure with entry.

*

*

*

When profits are higher under an interlaced structure, Proposition 2
contfnues to hold; both market configurations constitute Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3 and 4 are changed, however.

Sequential entry leads to
'

market interlacing, which is also the outcome of a Joint Stackelberg

equilibrium.
It is important to note that we are considering situations in which a
third firm commits itself to entry after firms A and B have made their
product line decisions.

If the entrant had committed itself beforehand,

a threat by firms A and B to interlace is not credible.

The subgame perfect

solution will in our example again be one of segmentation.

6.

On the Possibility of Destructive Competition
... Our analysis thus far has considered how competition between firms

.

leads to choice of product line.

An interesting, closely related issue

concerns how market structure can affect the degree of product variety.

In

this section we ask whether limiting each firm to one product can reduce
product variety.

Limiting product offering by any given firm does not seem

to be a m~jor regulatory objective, but it sometimes/used as a pro
competitive policy, as, for example, in granting of local radio licenses:
each station is allowed at most one frequency.
We examine the simplest possible case.
closely substitutable products.

There are two possible

For some levels of demand the market

wiii not support two rival firms, but a single firm could survive,

producing a single product, and the other firm, being rational, would not
enter.

It is also possible that a single firm producing both products

could earn nonnegative profits, while two noncooperative firms with one
product each could not.
This suggests the possibility that restricting an incumbent two-product
monopolist to a single product might serve no purpose other than to
reduce variety.

A foresighted rival might still choose not to enter.

The chief finding of this section is, somewhat surprisingly~ that under

-
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fairly weak restrictions on preferences this result is impossible.

If

two Nash-Cournot duopolists, each producing one product type, would sustain
losses, then a monopolist would never choose to produce both products.
A regulation confining each firm to a single product will not, in itself,

reduce product variety.
Consider a situation in which there are two products, each with inverse
demand functions given by
pl= fl{xl, x2)

(21)

P2 = f2(xl, x2)

(22}

where

These demand functions have the properties that

f}

f~ <
i

where f j

= af i /ax j •

{23)

i fj

< 0

If f~

J

0 there is no substitutability between the

=

two commodities while f~ = f~ if they are perfect substitutes.
J
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given by the

function R(x 1, x2) where
(24)
R(x 1, x2) = x1f 1{x 1, x2) + x2f 2{x 1, x2)
and let Ri(x 1, x2) represent the revenue from selling xi given

xj, j ; i.

Thus

Ri(xl, x2) = xifi(xl, x2)
(25)
We call R(x 1 , x2) the total revenue function and R1 (x 1, x2) the
own revenue function. Symmetry of f 1 guarantees that ~1(x 1, x2) = R2{x 2 , x1 ).
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For simplicity, we assume marginal cost is zero; therefore, the profit
of a two-product monopolist is
n2m

=

max [R(x 1 , x2 ) - 2K]
1 2
X ,X

(26)

Our synmetry assumption along with second-order conditions for a
1
2
maximum guarantee that the two-product monopolist will establish x = X •
Denote the common value of x. that attains n 2m as x2m. A two-product
1

monopolist therefore earns a profit
n2m = R(x 2m, x2m) - 2K = 2R 1 (x 2m, x2m) - 2K

(27)

-A one-product monopolist can attain a profit level

nlm = max [R(x1 , 0) - K]
xl
Denote the value of x that attains
1

(28)
n

1m as ~lm.

A one product mono

polist can therefore earn a profit
nlm = R(x 1m, 0) - K = R1 (x 1m, O) - K

{29)

(Here we have a~sumed, with no loss of generality, that the one-product
monopolist produces product 1).
Finally, consider the case of Cournot duopoly.

The firm producing pro

duct line 1 will choose x to attain
1
(30)

Similarly for the firm producing line 2.

Our assumption of symmetry and the

Routh-Hurwicz stability conditions for a Cournot duopoly insure that the two
firms establish the same level of output, which we denote xd.
of each duopolist is therefore

The profit

(31)
Stabil ity of the Cournot duopoly equilib rium and satsfac tion of the
second -order conditi on for a maximum for a two product monopolist imply the
Routh-Hurwicz conditi ons on the total revenue functio n:
= X f i•• + f1.· < 0

(32a)

i =1, 2

1

11

(32b)
We also impose the follow1ng restric tions on the marginal revenue
functio ns:
i
R..

=

i
R..

= X

lJ

JJ

f~ +
J

i
.f ..

1

JJ

f i..

X

lJ

<

<

0

{33a)

i t- j

{33b)

i t- j

0

Conditions (33) imply restric tions on prefere nces in additio n to those implie d.
by the Routh-Hurwicz stabil ity condit ions and require some comment.
First, conditi on (33a) is equiva lent to the restric tion that each Cournot
du~po list's reactio n functio n in x , x space is negativ ely sloped , since
1

2

..• This condit ion
the slope of the reactio n functio ns have the sign of RlJ
is satisfi ed in the linear case and whenever demand for either produc t line

becomes less price elastic as output of the other product rises. In order to
be violate d the demand for either product line must become signif icantly
more elastic as the output of the other product line increa ses. Condition
(33a) is always satisfi ed in the two extreme cases in which (i) there is no
subst~ tutabi lity between the two product lines (when Rij
i
two product lines are perfec t substi tutes (when Rij

=

= 0)

i

Ri;

<

and (ii) the
O).

Second
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condition (33b} states that the reduction in revenue from each product line
due to a one unit increase in the output of the other product line diminishes
as output of the other product line rises. ·Like condition (33a}, this
condition is satisfied in the case of linear demand functions.

Also like

condition (33a}, condition (33b) is always satisfied in the extreme case in
which there is no substitutability between the two product lines (when
Ri.. = O}
JJ

Pro~ciiiti~ri-6
Under conditions (33a) (negatively-sloped reaction function) and (33b)
{diminishing marginal cross-product effects on revenue) two products with
independent production technologies will not be produced by a monopolist when
two duopolists would not prod~ce them.
Proof:

See Appendix

Thus a one product per firm regulation will not lower variety.
Furthermore, since such a regulation would cause replacement of a two product
monopoly by a noncooperative duopoly, for certain levels of demand, such a
regulation could actually improve welfare.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has focussed on the (in our view} much neglected subject of
product line selection· by multiproduct firms.

We have restricted attention

to Ndemand sideu influences on product selection.
ucost-side" considerations are very important.

It is fairly clear that

In this paper products are

independent on the cost side, but if there were, for example, economies of
scope between particular products, there would, rather obviously, be. other
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things equal, a stronger incentive for one firm to produce these products.
Oil refineries produce a spectrum of different fuels, from heavy oil to light
fuels like kerosene, because they are all byproducts of each other:

a

fairly strong form of economies of scope.
There is a substantial recent literature on economies of scope and
multi product firms culminating in the 1982 book by Baumol, Panzar and
Willig (BPW).

One other important difference between this work an~ the

present paper, aside from the role of the cost side in the analysis, is the
a-ssumption concerning the expectations of firms.

In BPW, before a firm

enters, it takes the current price of each product as given, which produces,
not surprisingly, an outcome with some resemblance to perfect competition.
Our assumption is rather different:

firms understand, before anything

is actually produced, how the noncooperative game will work out.
Our basic result is that recognizing the real sequential nature of
decision making is important in understanding product line rivalry.

Market

segmentation, in which each firms controls a certain part of the product
spectrum, is an equilibrium outcome, although it will only be observed over
some fraction of the life cycle of the industry.

A~ interesting extension

suggests itself if we consider the possibility of further entry beyond the
first two firms in an industry. ·-An interlaced structure, in which close
substitutes are produced by different firms is a·more competitive structure
than segmentation.

More to the point, it is a commitment to greater comp

etition from the point of view of an additional potential entrant.

the

entrant might therefore be deterred from entry in an interlaced market
when:it would enter a segmented market:

competition as entry deterrence.

We have also considered the possible effect of restricting the number
of products a firm may produce.

In the simple case of·two products we

found that such a restriction would not lower variety.

If independent

Cournot duopolists could not make nonnegative profits producing one product
each, a two firm monopolist would not choose to produce two products either.
Our results have implications for the research and development
activity of firms that is aimed at introducing new products.

Our theory

suggests that a firm that is guaranteed a monopoly over a range of potential
products will seek to develop those products that are most distant
substitutes for what it is currently ·producing.

Production pf these products

wil.l reduce demand for the monopolist's current products least.

When

production of a range of potential products is limited to a group of comp-

products that are close substitutes for what they currently produce, since
joint production of these products will lead to less intense price and
. output competition at a later stage.

Finally, if there is threat of entry

by firms currently outside the market, firms may seek to develop products
that are more distant substitutes because the consequent competition may
be so intense as to deter entry.

- 25 -

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6:
We need to establish that nd < O (that each duopolist sustains a loss)
impliesn 1m >

11

2m

(that a monopolist would choose to produce only one

product line).
tr

lm

-

n

2m

ar::

In terms of the contrapo sitive, we need to show that
O implies that n d > 0, or (with zero marginal cost) that
2Rl(x2m,x2m) _ Rl(xlm,O) > K
(Al)

impl i es

Rl ( x d, xd)

> K

( A2)

Expression (Al) implies (A2) if the following condition holds:
2R 1 (x 2m, x2m) - R1 (x 1m. 0) :... R1 (xd, xd) < 0

i.e.

(A3)

if the revenue of a two product monopolist is less than that of a

duopolis t plus that of a one-product monopolist.
The rest of the proof is devoted to showing that (A3) holds.
By the definitio n of a maximum
R1 ( X 2m, 0) < R1( X lm, 0)
R1( x 2m _ xd)
,

,.

I

<

R
1, l(d _
- \ •-

JI

{A4)

xd,

.,

(A5)

I

Condition {A3) is therefore implied by
2Rl(x2m, x2m) _ Rl(x2m, O} --Rl(x2m, xd)

<

0

(A6)

Condition {33a) (negative ly-sloped reaction functions ) implies that
xd <

xlm

1
d
.
since xd is the value of x1 that maximizes R1 (x,
x) wh1le
xlm

1
maximizes R1 (x.
0).

(A7)
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The Routh-Hur1'Ji cz stability condition guarantees that
lm

X

<

2m
2X

(AB)

This result can be shown by defining the function
(A9)

where R is the total revenue function as defined on page 19.
Taking the derivative of g yields
(AlO)

whicfi"is negative if the stability condition is satisfied. We have
g(O) = R (x 2m, x2m) = 0, by the first order condition for the monopoli~t.
1
Then s~nce g(l) = R1(2x 2m, 0) it follows that R1(2x 2m, O) < 0. This
implies that x1m < 2x 2m since R (x 1m, 0) = 0 and R < 0.
11
1
Conditions (Al) and (AB) together imply
Xd < 2x2m

(A 11)

The final step is to note that the following condition holds
2R1 (x 2m, x2m) - R1(x 2m, 0) - R1 (x 2m, 2x 2m)

<

0

(Al2)

. ro
~ l ..1ows ,oecause ...
1 x2 J\ 1s
. a convex f unc t 10n
.
2 g,ven
.
K1 ( x,
o·f' x,
xl
Th 1s

(by (33b)). Since (x 2m, x2m) is the_ midpoint between (x 2m, 0) and
(x 2m, 2x 2m), then R1(x 2m, x2m) is _less than the average of R1 (x 2m, 0)
and R1 (x 2m, 2x 2m), which leads directly to (A12).

Then (A12) and (All) imply (A6), which implies (A3), which completes the
proof.

*

Footnotes

1.

The two classic approaches to product selectio n derive from the work of
Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933). Most of recent work in these
traditio ns, includin g the widely cited work of Lancaster (1979), Dixit
and Stiglitz {1977), Spence (1976).and Salop (1979) focus on the one
product per firm case.

2·.

The term convnitment (or "credib le threat" ) refers to the important idea
that in strateg ic interac tion, a firm (or player) might reasonably
be expected to believe that a rival will only pursue actions that are
in the rival's best interes ts. Threats that can only be carried out
through suboptimal behaviour (as in the Sylos-Labini limit output
model) are not credibl e.

This idea goes back at .least as far as

Schellin g (1956), but has only received attentio n recently .

Recent

work includes Spence (1977, 1979), Friedman (1979), Oixit (1980).and
Eaton and Lipsey (1980, 1981).
3.

Whether price or quantity Nash equilib ria are appropr iate depends on
the nature of product ion. Indeed, it may be useful to think of quant
ity and price as occurrin g sequent ially.

If a quantity decision is a

credible commitment, due perhaps to practica l irreves ibilitie s in
production and high storage costs, and price later clears the market,
then quantity should be regarded as the third stage decis_ion variabl e.
Alterna tively, if a price announcement is a credibl e threat, with
quantity being the residua l variable that clears the market, the third
stage should be modelle~ as a price game. (This interpr etation is in
Friedman (1980).

For some other comments on the issue of price vs.
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quantity Nash equilibria see Bresnahan {1981))
4.

The concept of subgame perfection is associated with Selten (1975) and
has been the focus of considerable recent attention in the literature.
One use of the concept similar to ours is Shaked and Sutton {1982).

5.

This is the "mean value for several variables" as described in, for
example, Rosenlicht {1968). This kind of use of the mean value theorem
must be well known but does not seem to have as widely used in economics
as it might have.

~-

One similar use is in Spencer(1979).

It might seem obvious that with synvnetric demand the best response to a
two-product choice by a rival is to choose the other two products.
(Certainly this is true for the linear case).

However, the result is

not completely general, but we restrict attention to cases for which it
does hold.
7.

This market structure is similar to the one examined by Prescott and
Visscher (1977), who considered sequential entry by firms precommitted
to a si.ngle product.

Here we consider sequential entry by firms

precommitted to two products.

Prescott and Visscher also assume that

the entry and line decisions are simultaneous rather than sequential as
we assume here.
8.

The term Stackelberg is sometimes used to mean that one player acts before
another.

Stackelberg's original model can be interpreted in either way,

and usage seems to be divided.
9.

This last result depends.upon our assumption that competition at the
final stage is a Nash game in outputs (a Cournot-Nash game).

Were it

·~ Nash game in prices (a Bertrand-Nash game) then no more than one
firm would ever produce the same product.

{Apart from this, our

conclusions here are relatively insensitive to the precise nature of
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competition at the output stage.)
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